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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal from an Order and Judgment signed and 
entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third Judicial District 
Court on April 30, 1990, wherein the Appellant's Petition to Modify 
was denied and Appellant's requested judgment for one-half of the 
net income of the Appellee for the years 1981 through 1989 was 
denied. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying Appellant's request that alimony be reduced or terminated 
based upon a substantial change in Appellee's circumstances and 
Appellee's ability to earn income? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in not attributing to 
Appellee a net income equal to $1,600 per month (the earnings 
before Appellee voluntarily became a real estate salesperson) in 
modifying and/or decreasing alimony? 
3. .Whether the trial court erred by holding that 
Appellant's failure to discover the Appellee's true earnings and 
Appellant's failure to assert his right to reduce his alimony 
payments by one-half of Appellee's earnings constituted a waiver of 
Appellant's right to reduce his alimony payments, in accordance 
with the Decree of Divorce, which has not been modified? 
4. Whether the trial court erred in holding that 
Appellant was estopped to assert his right for a judgment against 
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Appellee for one-half of her net earnings of approximately $55,000 
from 1981 through 1989? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The applicable standard of review for all issues 
presented on appeal is succinctly stated in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 
P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), wherein the court declared: 
While it is true in equity cases this Court 
may review questions of both law and fact we 
are not bound to substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court, and because of its 
advantaged position we give considerable 
deference to its findings and judgment. 
Id. at 431. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made 
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
When findings of fact are made in action tried 
by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings may thereafter be raised whethesr or 
not the party raising the question has made in 
the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or amotion for a 
new trial. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1953). 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property as is reasonable 
and necessary. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Proceedings Below, 
Appellant Howard Hinckley (hereinafter -Howard-) filed a 
petition to reduce or terminate alimony in March 1989. Appellee 
Charlene Hinckley (hereinafter "Charlene") subsequently filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim. The case was tried by the court sitting 
without a jury on March 21, 1990. The court rendered its 
Memorandum Decision on April 13, 1990, denying Howard's Petition 
and Charlene's Counterclaim. The court found that Howard had 
waived his right to reduce his alimony payments by one-half of 
Charleners net earnings for the years 1981 through 1989, and was 
estopped from now asserting his right and obtaining judgment 
against Charlene in that amount. The court awarded Charlene 
judgment against Howard for unpaid alimony in the sum of $6,000.00. 
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment on April 30, 1990. Howard filed an Objection to Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(b), moving the court to amend the Judgment 
accordingly, on April 30, 1990. An Order denying Howard's 
Objection was signed and entered on May 25, 1990. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
Charlene was granted a Decree of Divorce from Howard on 
November 20, 1980. (R. 65). The Decree provides that Howard shall 
pay to Charlene alimony in the amount of $1,200 per month. (R. 62). 
The Decree further provides that the amount of alimony due from 
Howard to Charlene "shall be reduced by one-half of the net amount 
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of [Charlene#s] net income earned and received from her employment, 
if any. •• (R. 62) . 
Howard filed a petition to reduce or terminate alimony on 
March 10, 1989, based upon his belief that Charlene was gainfully 
employed and that Charlene had failed to inform Howard of her 
income. (R. 92). Howard continued to make the alimony payments 
until November, 1989, at which time he discontinued alimony 
payments based upon his discovery that Charlene had net earnings in 
excess of $50,000, of which she had refused to advise him. 
(Transcript 119). 
For the years 1981 through 1988, Charlene had net 
earnings in excess of $55,000, as verified by her response to 
Interrogatories, (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1), her employment 
record, (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 2), her federal income tax 
returns for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988, (Defendant's Trial 
Exhibits 3, 4, & 5) and her testimony at trial (Transcript 13-16, 
35-36). 
All of Howard's income is reflected accurately in his tax 
returns (R. 71). Howard's 1979 federal income tax return reflects 
total income of $34,852 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12). Howard's 
1986 federal income tax return reflects total income of $15,120 
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 13). Howard's 1987 federal income tax 
return reflects total income of $21,244 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 
14). Howard's 1988 federal income tax return reflects total income 
of $23,186 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15). Howard testified that 
his gross business income for 1989 was approximately $102,000, 
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$8,996 more than in 1988 (Transcript 88-89), while his business 
expenses remained approximately the same (Transcript 62). Adding 
$8,996 to Howard's gross personal income of $23,186 for 1988 
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15) based upon the testimony that the 
business expenses were approximately the same for 1989 as they were 
for 1988 (Transcript 62), and deducting alimony of $12,000 from 
Howard's gross personal income for 1989, Howard's net personal 
income for 1989 was approximately $20,182 - less than his net 
personal income at the time of the divorce. (Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit 15; Transcript 62, 88-89). 
The Record reflects the following substantial changes in 
the relative circumstances of the parties: 
1. Howard was 66-1/2 years old at the time of trial, 
and expressed a desire to retire. (Transcript 63). Howard 
testified that he wanted to sell his apartments to reduce his 
responsibilities and stress and that he might also sell his 
barbershops. (Transcript 63-64). Howard further testified that 
his personal earning capacity had diminished, that he could not 
keep up his apartments himself and that he could not cut hair as 
much as he used to. (Transcript 87). Howard's net personal income 
for 1989 was approximately $20,182, less than his net personal 
income at the time of the divorce. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15; 
Transcript 62, 88-89). 
2. At the time of the divorce, when she was responsible 
for the care and maintenance of the parties' two teenage children, 
Charlene claimed monthly expenses of $2,267.45. (Plaintiff's Trial 
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Exhibit 1). The children of the parties are now emancipated, 
leaving the Charlene with no time commitment or financial 
obligation to dependent children. She now claims monthly expenses 
of $2,621.59 for just herself. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 21). 
3. Charlene still lives in the marital home and has 
done substantial remodeling to the home, improving and enlarging 
the living area significantly and increasing the value 
considerably. (Transcript 39-40, 135-136). At the time of the 
divorce, the balance on the mortgage was $9,300.00 (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibit 2), with a monthly payment, including taxes and 
insurance, of $285.59. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1). Charlene 
refinanced the home to pay for the remodeling and now has a monthly 
payment in excess of $500.00. (Transcript 40). Charlene makes 
these monthly payments from the proceeds of the sale of the duplex 
awarded her in the Decree. (Transcript 41). 
4. Howard lives in a $225.00 per month apartment, which 
living accommodations are far less than when he lived in the home 
of the parties. (Transcript 164, 136). At the time of the 
divorce, Howard claimed monthly living expenses of $1,282.00. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 2). He now has monthly living expenses 
of $1,767.00. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 6). 
5. Charlene did not work outside the home during 
parties' marriage, although she has had a realtor's license since 
1971 or 1972. (Transcript 44). Charlene is now employed outside 
the home as a real estate agent. (Transcript 18). Charlene drives 
a 1988 Honda, which she leases for $250.00 a month for use in her 
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business, enabling her to expense the lease payments. (Transcript 
161) . 
6. Prior to her decision to pursue a career as a real 
estate agent, Charlene was employed at State Mutual Insurance, 
earning wages of $16,393.00 in 1986, as reflected on her 1986 
federal income tax return. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 5). This 
income, combined with interest income and rents received, and 
exclusive of alimony, gave her a gross income in excess of $21,000 
for the year 1986. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 5). 
The trial court made no findings regarding Charlene's 
past or current earnings or Charlene's past or current ability to 
support herself in her accustomed standard of living, (R. 397, 
401), but instead focused his inquiry upon whether Howard could 
afford to continue paying alimony to Charlene. (R. 397, 401-402). 
Transcript 56-57). The court declined to hear evidence regarding 
Charlene's standard of living and her ability to support herself. 
The court made no finding that Charlene was unable to 
obtain employment, and in fact, the record shows that she is 
currently employed as a real estate sales person and that she has 
been almost continuously employed since the parties' divorce. 
(Transcript 12-18). 
The court made no findings regarding Charlene's standard 
of living. Charlene testified that she did not buy on credit 
during her marriage, but waited until she could pay cash to make 
her purchases. (Transcript 139). She further testified that she 
still buys the things she wants, but now buys them on credit rather 
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than with cash. (Transcript 139). Her Financial Declaration shows 
that she has not hesitated to incur debts to improve her lifestyle, 
showing a balance of $45,156.49 on the loan to remodel and enlarge 
her home, a balance of $1,319.47 on her Visa, and a balance of 
$869.64 on her ZCMI account at the time of trial. (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibit 21). It is curious to note that, while Charlene has 
claimed monthly expenses of $2,621.59, she has declared income of 
only $1,869.54. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 21). This discrepancy 
was not addressed by the court. 
Also not addressed by the court is the fact that Charlene 
has retained counsel in Texas and had paid retainers to two 
separate attorneys in the amount of $3,000 as of January 1989. 
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 11, p.5). The court failed to determine 
if this expense was included in Charlene's statement of living 
expenses and where Charlene obtained the money to pay these 
retainers. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Howard's 
request to reduce or terminate alimony, even though the record 
reflects a substantial change in the relative circumstances of the 
parties. The court failed to make a finding regarding Charlene's 
standard of living and her ability to earn income. The court also 
failed to address Howard's age and decrease in his income. The 
trial court erred in not attributing to Charlene a net income equal 
to $1,600 per month, the amount she was earning at the time she 
voluntarily became a real estate salesperson, a career which 
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conveniently yields no net income, in making a determination 
regarding modification or termination of alimony• 
The trial court further erred by holding that Howard's 
failure to discover Charlene's true earnings and Howard's failure 
to assert his right to reduce his alimony payments by one-half of 
Charlene's earnings constituted a waiver of Howard's right to 
reduce his alimony payments in accordance with the Decree of 
Divorce. Howard's actions or failure to act do not meet these 
criteria for a waiver. Furthermore, the record does not reflect 
any affirmative act or conduct on Howard's part which supports the 
court's finding of estoppel. The trial court further erred in 
holding that Howard waived his right to a judgment against Charlene 
for one-half of her net earnings from 1981 through 1989. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
HOWARD'S REQUEST TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE ALIMONY. 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
the amount of alimony appropriate in a given case, and will be 
upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
shown." Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah App. 
1990)(citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 1986)); 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah App. 1989)). In the 
case at bar, the trial court has clearly abused its discretion by 
denying Howard's request to reduce or terminate alimony, even 
though the record reflects a substantial change in Charlene's 
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circumstances, and by failing to make any findings regarding 
Charlene's standard of living and her ability to support herself. 
A. The Record Reflects a Substantial Change in 
Circumstances Warranting Modification of the 
Divorce Decree. 
Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides that 
the district court has continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases "to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties ... as shall be reasonable 
and necessary." Utah courts have construed this statute to 
"empower the court to make a modification where there has been a 
substantial change in the material circumstances of either one or 
both of the parties since the decree was entered." Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 361, 438 P.2d 180, 181 (1968)(emphasis 
added). 
The policy underlying the requirement of a substantial 
change in circumstances is stated in Haslam v. Haslam, 647 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1983), wherein the court declared: 
To provide some stability to decrees, however 
and to prevent the inundation of the courts 
with petitions for modification, a party 
seeking a modification must demonstrate a 
substantial changes of circumstances. E.g. , 
Adams v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979). 
Id. at 758. 
In Haslam, the former husband filed a petition to 
terminate alimony based upon the fact that the former wife had 
obtained employment and had increased her income, while the former 
husband had retired and received in income approximately the same 
amount as at the time of the divorce. At the time of the divorce, 
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the former husband earned between $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 per 
month, while the former wife was unemployed. Subsequent to the 
divorce, the former wife became employed, earning $1,100.00 per 
month, and supplemented her income with interest from a savings 
account, while the former husband retired and drew approximately 
the same income as he had at the time of the divorce. Id. at 758. 
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the 
former husband had not shown a sufficient change of circumstances. 
Id, at 758. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, 
reinstated the petition and remanded the case for further 
proceedings to modify the decree, stating: 
On the instant facts it is clear that there 
has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former 
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment, 
experienced a substantial increase in income 
and has accumulated some savings. Mr. Haslam 
has retired and presently receives income in 
approximately the same amount as he received 
at the time of the divorce some seventeen 
years ago. 
Under the circumstances of his case, we think 
that the combination of the supporting 
spouses' retirement, together with the 
dependent spouse's employment, earning of a 
substantial income, and accumulation of 
substantial savings subsequent to the original 
divorce decree, constitutes a substantial 
change of circumstances. 
Id. at 758. 
Similarly, in Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 
1984), the trial court ordered termination of alimony for the 
former wife based upon the facts that the parties' child no longer 
resided with the former wife and she provided no support for the 
11 
child, the former wife had income producing assets, and the foanner 
wife had the ability to perform some work, while the income of the 
former husband had increased only marginally. In affirming the 
trial court's ruling the Utah Supreme Court held: 
A relative change in the income and expenses 
of the parties, if comparatively significant, 
can amount to ci substantial change in 
circumstances. (Citations omitted). The 
facts of this case support the trial court's 
finding of a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
Id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
In Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 
1990), even though the former husband conceded that he had the 
ability to continue paying alimony, the trial court granted 
termination of alimony based upon the facts that 1) the parties' 
children were emancipated, and 2) while the former wife was 
unemployed during the parties' marriage and had no income from 
outside sources, she had subsequently obtained a Master's degree in 
social work and had become employed with a salary in 1987 of 
$16,203.77 and had acquired income-producing assets. Id. at 242. 
This court upheld the ruling of the trial court, stating: 
In this case, defendant conceded that he had 
the economic ability to continue paying 
alimony. Therefore, the question before us is 
whether there was a sufficient material change 
in plaintiff circumstances to justify 
termination of alimony. At the time of the 
divorce, the parties had a family income of 
about $30,000 per year, consisting solely of 
defendant's salary, to provide for a family of 
four. In contrast, by the time of the hearing 
on the petition for modification, 
approximately twenty-two years later, 
plaintiff had income from salary and other 
sources of approximately $22,000 per yecir, to 
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support herself only. She also had 
accumulated substantial assets. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
finding that this constituted a substantial 
change in circumstances. 
Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the 
former husband in Bridenbaugh, had increased his salary by eight 
times the amount he had been earning at the time of the divorce and 
had increased his net worth to $2.5 million. The court found that 
the former husband was fully able to pay alimony, but terminated 
the alimony anyway, based upon the ability of the former wife to 
support herself. Id. at 242-43. 
Additionally, in Sorensen, supra, the court outlined 
specific considerations for determining whether a modification is 
warranted, stating: 
The fact that the wife owns property which has 
increased substantially in value or ability to 
produce income after the entry of the decree 
for alimony is an important consideration, as 
is the fact that a child whom the wife has 
been supporting has married and has become 
employed and self-supporting. 
20 Utah 2d at 361, 438 P.2d at 181. 
In the case at bar, Charlene has obtained employment and 
had increased her income, while Howard wishes to retire and 
currently receives in income less than he received at the time of 
the divorce. The parties' children no longer reside with Charlene, 
she provides no support for the children, and Dayna Hinckley 
Atherley has married and has become employed and self-supporting. 
Charlene was unemployed during the parties' marriage and had no 
income from outside sources. She has subsequently decided to 
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utilize the realtor's license she has had since 1971 or 1972. 
Prior to her career choice, Charlene was employed with a salary in 
1986 of $16,393.00, which income, combined with interest income and 
rents received, and exclusive of alimony, gave her a gross income 
in excess of $21,000. Charlene currently has income producing 
assets as well as the ability to perform work, as evidenced by her 
present employment. Charlene's home has also increased 
substantially in value since the entry of the decree. Charlene's 
circumstances have changed substantially, warranting termination or 
reduction of alimony paid to her by Howard. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Make Any Findings 
Regarding Charlene's Standard of Living and 
Charlene's Ability to Provide For Herself. 
A trial court must consider three factors in 
setting a reasonable award of alimony: 1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient 
income for him or herself: and 3) the ability 
of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 
1988)(emphasis added). In the case at bar, the trial court made 
findings regarding only one* of the three factors outlined in 
Throckmorton: the ability of the responding spouse, Howard, to 
continue paying support. There is no evidence in the record to 
indicate that the trial court even considered the other two 
factors. In fact, the record reflects that the court deliberately 
failed to consider Charlene's financial condition and ability to 
produce income: 
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MR. de JONGE: Well, your honor, 
unfortunately, the issue here is the standard 
of living. ... 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. The issue, as I 
see it, is material change of circumstances. 
MR. de JONGE: Well, material change in 
circumstances, but, by the same token, your 
Honor, Mrs. Hinckley is entitled to a standard 
of living consistent to what she had at the 
time of the divorce, and I think the Court 
needs to be aware of the fact that she simply 
isn't capable of providing that standard of 
living on her own. 
THE COURT: She is not being asked to do it. 
Well, maybe she is. 
MR. BROWN: She is. 
MR. de JONGE: That's what has been alleged. 
THE COURT: Well, that's not a real issue in 
the mind of the Court, though. I don't think 
you need to dwell on whether or not I am going 
to cut her alimony entirely. I think the 
issue is whether or not Mr. Hinckley's income 
has been depleted to the point to where he 
cannot afford to pay what he is paying. 
(Transcript 56-57)(emphasis added). With regard to such a failure, 
the Throckmorton court held: 
[I]t is reversible error if a trial court 
fails to make findings on all material issues 
unless the facts in the record are "'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only 
a finding in favor of the judgment.'" 
(Citations omitted.) 
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse 
of discretion in setting alimony when the 
trial court failed to make findings on the 
financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse. See e.g., Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983)(remanded since 
the trial court made no findings with regard 
to receiving spouse's ability to work); Ruhsam 
v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)(trial court failed to adequately address 
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the financial needs of the claimant spouse,, 
making it necessary for the reviewing court to 
remand the issue for further findings). 
Id. at 124 (emphasis added). 
These requirements were also discussed by this Court in 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988), wherein the 
court stated: 
In exercising its discretion in determining 
the amount of alimony to be awarded, the trial 
court must consider the financial condition 
and needs of the spouse claiming support, the 
ability of that spouse to provide sufficient 
income for him or herself, and the ability of 
the responding spouse to provide the support. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d [96] at 101 [(Utah 1986)]. 
Failure to consider these factors constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that 
the trial court must make findings on all 
material issues. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 (Utah 1987). These findings "should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached." :id. at 999 (quoting 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979)) . 
The findings of fact made by the trial court 
do not specifically set forth appellant's 
financial condition and need for support, 
including her earning capacity or respondent's 
income and ability to pay. Such a failure to 
address the Paffel factors explicitly in the 
findings of fact requires remand to the trial 
court. Gardner fv. Gardner], 748 P.2d [1076] 
at 1082 [(Utah 1988)]. 
Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958. 
In the case at bar, the court failed to make any findings 
on the material issues of Charlene's standard of living and her 
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ability to support herself in accordance with the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the parties' marriage. Such failure 
constitutes reversible error. 
The court's failure to make appropriate findings has 
resulted in an inappropriate denial of Howard's petition to reduce 
or terminate alimony. In Bridenbauqh, this court held: 
The appropriate test to determine whether [a] 
termination in alimony [is] appropriate is 
whether [Appellee] is now able to provide for 
herself a standard of living which is equal to 
that enjoyed during the marriage of the 
parties. 
Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d at 243. Because the trial court failed to 
make any findings regarding Charlene's standard of living and her 
ability to support herself, it is clear that the court failed to 
apply the Bridenbauqh test. 
In considering Howard's petition, the trial court failed 
to consider the fundamental purpose of alimony, which is "to enable 
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames, 735 P2d. 395, 397 
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 
(Utah 1986)); Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124. 
[T]he purpose of alimony is to allow 
the recipient spouse a standard of 
living as close as possible to that 
experienced during the marriage, not 
to keep pace with the payor spouse. 
Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d at 242 (emphasis added). The evidence shows 
that the Charlene is living far above the standard of living 
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enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. Howard should not be 
compelled to support Charlene in her current improved lifestyle. 
POINT II 
HOWARD'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER CHARLENE'S TRUE EARNINGS 
AND FAILURE TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT TO REDUCE HIS 
ALIMONY PAYMENTS BY ONE-HALF OF CHARLENE"S EARNINGS 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL. 
The trial court found that Howard had waived his right to 
reduce his alimony payments by one-half of Charlene's net earnings 
for the years 1981 through 1989, and was estopped from asserting 
his rights and obtaining judgment in that amount. The Supreme 
Court of Utah discussed the doctrines of waiver and estoppel in 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), stating: 
The common element of the doctrines of waiver 
and estoppel is the requirement of action or 
conduct by the person against whom the 
doctrines are asserted. 
Id. at 432. In the case at bar, there has been no action or 
conduct by Howard which meets the criteria for waiver or estoppel. 
A. Howard Has Not Waived His Right to Reduce His 
Alimony Payments by One-Half of Charlene's Net 
Income From Her Employment. 
In Hunter, the Court clearly stated the r€*quirements for 
waiver as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of 
a known right. To constitute a waiver, there 
must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish it. It must be 
distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied. (Citations omitted.) To constitute 
a waiver, one's actions or conduct must be 
distinctly made, must evince in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and 
must be inconsistent with any other intent. 
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Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432 (emphasis added). 
In Hunter, the custodial parent had failed to bring an 
action to enforce the child support obligations of the non-
custodial parent for nine years. The custodial parent had gone 
into hiding shortly after the decree was entered and had not made 
any effort to collect the child support payments. The trial court 
found that the custodial parent had waived her right to enforce the 
support obligation. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the 
judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with instructions 
to enter judgment for the full amount of child support claimed, 
stating: 
[T]he appellant's inaction is insufficient to 
support a finding of waiver or estoppel. The 
appellant's action does not unequivocally 
evince an intent to waive her right to the 
accrued child support. 
Id. at 432-33 (emphasis added). 
Charlene herself testified that at no time did she 
provide Howard with any information regarding her net earnings, as 
follows: 
Q. Isn't it true that you would historically 
go to Mr. Hinckley's place of business and 
pick up the check, either personally or send 
one of your children to pick up the check? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You did that every month, didn't you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Or your children? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Most frequently you would send your 
children; is that correct? 
A. No, most frequemtly I did it. 
Q. At any time that you came to Mr. 
Hinckley's shop to pick up the check, did you 
say, "By the way, Mr. Hinckley I am now 
working and this is my monthly income and your 
payments should be reduced by whatever"? 
A. No. I never said that. 
(Transcript 10, 15)(emphasis added). 
Later in her testimony, Charlene further stated: 
Q. Now, Ms. Hinckley, during most of this 
period of time, as you were working for 
Guardian Life, did you tell Mr. Hinckley, "By 
the way, Mr. Hinckley," on the monthly pickup 
of the checks, "I am now working and it should 
be reduced by one-half of this amount"? 
A. No. 
(Transcript 16-17)(emphasis added). 
With regard to her income tax information, she testified: 
Q. Prior to the responses to the 
interrogatories which is Exhibit No. 1, have 
you ever furnished Mr. Hinckley with any tax 
returns? 
A. No, sir. 
(Transcript 18). Charlene testified that she had received a 
request for such information from former counsel in 1989 
(Defendant's Exhibit 6), but had failed to respond. (Transcript 
19). 
With regard to her earnings in 1989, Charlene testified: 
Q. Did you receive any money in 1989? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What did you receive? 
A. About $4,200. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Hinckley about that 
$4,200? 
A. No. 
(Tiranscript 36). 
Further, in her affidavit of June 14, 1989, Charlene 
stated: 
d. Because defendant and I have maintained 
constant contact with each other since the 
divorce (more than several times a week over 
the past eight years) and although we see each 
other often, the issue of my employment and 
income, or my obligation to repay him a 
portion thereof, has never come up between us. 
(R. 125). 
Howard testified that he had repeatedly asked for 
information regarding Charlene's net earnings, but never received 
such information until this action was commenced: 
Q. Now, Mr. Hinckley, have you made requests 
from time to time to your wife for an 
accounting of her earnings to have the alimony 
be offset by 50 per cent, as per the court 
order? 
A. It's been some years since I have made a 
request. Most the time when I did make 
requests was the few years after we were 
divorced. And if I ever did ask her, try to 
find out, it just so happens that she wasn't 
working or she might have been between jobs, 
and I didn't know how to handle it. I knew 
that she was but I just let it go. 
Q. All right. Did you tend to forgive that? 
A. Not necessarily. I think I had an 
awesome responsibility of cutting 400 heads of 
hair a week to pay that alimony. I could 
never forget it. 
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(Transcript 62-63). 
He later testified: 
Q. And did you understand at the time — 
what did you understand at the time the order 
was entered relative to alimony? 
A. Well, it is my understanding I was to pay 
$1,200 a month, get Charlene — if she worked 
she was to deduct 50 per cent of whatever her 
net earnings were. 
Q. At some point in time did you discover 
that there had been substantial net earnings? 
A. Well, it's bcien quite a time to find 
these net earnings, but it's just been within 
the last year that I have been able to find 
those net earnings, because it was kind of a 
secret. 
(Transcript 118-119). 
It was not Howard's intention to forgive the 50% offset 
provided for by the Decree. (Transcript 63). Dayna Atherley 
testified at trial regarding a conversation with Howard in 1985: 
Q. You had an occasion, then, to go to your 
father's shop to pick up the check? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you hcive a conversation with your 
father at that time? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what essentially did you talk about? 
A. The child support was supposed to be in a 
check. 
Q. So you asked him for a check for $1,400 
at that time? 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Q. And how much did he write the check for? 
A. $1,200. 
Q. And did you make an inquiry as to why the 
check was only $1,200? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was his response to that? 
A. He said that my mother owed him money 
because she was working, and so he guessed 
they were basically even. 
(Transcript 130-131). 
Howard also testified regarding the conversation in 1985: 
Q. Drawing your attention to the testimony 
by Dana [sic] that was heard earlier today 
about the conversation, I suppose sometime in 
1985, I'm going to say close to Brent's 21st 
birthday, okay? You heard that testimony, 
sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall such a conversation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall a conversation at that 
time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell us what that conversation was? 
A. Well, I asked Dana [sic] if she was 
working at the time and she said no. 
THE COURT: You asked Dana [sic] if her mother was 
working? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
(Transcript 163-164). 
23 
In the case at bar, Howard has a right to reduce alimony 
payments to Charlene in the amount of one-half of her net income 
from her employment. Howard testified that he never intended to 
forgive the 50% offset. He further testified that he had inquired 
regarding Charlene's income on numerous occasions, but was never 
able to discover the amount of her income. Charlene's failure to 
give Howard any information regarding her net income is clearly 
shown by her sworn testimony and admissions. Dayna Atherley 
testified of an occasion when she claimed Howard had reduced the 
alimony check by $200.00 basesd upon his belief that Charlene had 
earnings from employee. Howard disputed this testimony, but if 
such a conversation took place, it would clearly show that Howard 
did intend to enforce the 50% offset for some period of time. It 
is not clear from Dayna's testimony exactly what period of time 
Howard intended the alleged 1985 offset to cover, but Dayna's 
testimony certainly does not evidence any intent on Howard's part 
to completely relinquish his right of offset forever. 
The record reveals no distinct actions or conduct on 
Howard's part which unequivocally evidence any intent to waive his 
right of offset. There is no evidence in the record that Howard 
ever told Charlene that he did not intend to enforce his right. 
Howard's inability to obtciin reliable information regarding 
Charlene's income, coupled with his failure to enforce his rights 
based upon that inability, do not unequivocally evince an intention 
to relinquish his right to offset Charlene's income against his 
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alimony payments. The facts of this case do not support the trial 
court's finding of a waiver on the part of the Howard. 
B. Howard's Failure to Assert His Right 
to Reduce the Alimony Payment by One-Half 
of Charlene's Net Income Does Not Support 
A Finding of Estoppel. 
The Hunter court also outlined the criteria for 
application of the doctrine of estoppel, stating: 
Estoppel ... is a doctrine which precludes 
parties from asserting their rights where 
their actions or conduct render it inequitable 
to allow them to assert those rights. 
. . . 
The doctrine of estoppel has application when 
one, by his acts, representations, or conduct, 
or by his silence when he ought to speak, 
induces another to believe certain facts exist 
and such other relies thereon to his 
detriment. 
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432. These criteria were not met in the 
instant case. 
1. Howard's Failure to Press the Issue 
of his Right of Offset Does Not Support 
the Trial Court's Finding of Estoppel. 
The Hunter court found that the appellant had no duty to 
request child support payments and held that "a finding of estoppel 
by the trial court based only on the appellant's silence and 
failure to act was in error." Hunter, 669 P.2d at 433 (citing 
French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965)). 
In French, supra, the appellant brought an action seeking 
to recover 106 months' delinquent monthly child support payments. 
The trial court relieved the appellee of the past payments because 
the appellant had been dilatory in requesting payments and 
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producing her forwarding addresses to the appellee. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court, stating: 
The facts show no representations, either 
explicit or implicit, by plaintiff to 
defendant with respect to discontinuation of 
payments, and it is doubtful if such 
circumstance would be of prime importance. 
Mere silence over a period of time will not 
raise an estoppel where there is no legal or 
moral duty to speak. The court did not 
condition the payments upon a request for such 
by rappellant!. 
Id. at 315-16. 
In Adams v. Adams, 593 P. 2d 147 (Utah 1979), the 
appellant sought a judgment for five and one-half years' unpaid 
alimony. The trial court found that: 
[T]he [appellant] knew or should have known 
that the [appellee] did not recognize a duty 
to pay alimony, since he had paid none; that 
[appellant] had a duty to inform defendant 
that she claimed alimony, and that by her 
silence for five and on-half years she was 
estopped from claiming alimony against 
[appellee]. 
Id. at 148. 
The Utah Supreme court reversed the decision of the trial 
court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of the appellant for the entire amount of unpaid alimony, 
stating: 
Mere silence on the part of [appellant] is not 
sufficient to raise an estoppel and we find 
nothing in the record to support the Court's 
finding that she had a duty to speak. 
Id. at 148. 
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While the facts of the instant case differ somewhat from 
the cases cited above, the legal principals applied in the above 
cases are readily susceptible to application to the case at bar. 
In the case at bar, the court did not condition the 
reduction of alimony payments by one-half of the Charlene's net 
income upon a request by Howard for information regarding 
Charlene's net income. Howard was entitled by the terms of the 
decree to expect that information regarding Charlene's net income 
would be provided to him so that he could enforce the terms of the 
decree. The decree did not confer upon Howard a duty to speak, but 
rather conferred such a duty upon the Charlene. 
Even in the absence of a duty to speak on his part, that 
he had asked for information regarding Charlene's net income on 
numerous occasions and had been told that she was not working or 
was between jobs. Charlene testified herself that she never 
provided Howard with information regarding her income. The record 
does not indicate that Howard at any time personally indicated to 
Charlene that he did not intend to enforce the provision of the 
decree. 
2. There is No Evidence in the Record That 
Charlene Justifiably Relied Upon Any 
Affirmative Act of Howard to Her Detriment. 
A crucial element of estoppel is a detrimental change in 
position based upon the representations or action of the party 
charged. See, e.g. , Adams, 593 P.2d at 148. There is no evidence 
in the record that Appellee relied upon any representation or 
action of Howard to her detriment. 
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As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974): 
This requirement is not satisfied by the mere 
fact that [Appellee] indulged in the pleasant 
and euphoric assumption that he would not have 
to meet his obligations and that he bought a 
more expensive car and moved to a more 
expensive apartment. Likewise, the mere 
passage of time, or the failure of a creditor 
[(Appellant]) to bedevil the debtor for 
payment does not create an estoppel. 
Id. at 144 (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, Charlene testified that she changed 
her career and incurred debts to remodel her home based upon her 
assumption that she would not be compelled to abide by the terms of 
the decree. As she testified: 
Q. Did Mr. Hinckley's willingness not to 
require you to repay that money have anything 
to do with that decision? 
A. Certainly. When I figured that he wasn't 
going to ask me to pay, why then, I could do 
some of the things I wanted to because I knew 
I could pay it off over a period of time, if I 
had that alimony coming in as kind of a 
support system. ... 
Q. Did your sale of the duplex, was that in 
any way affected by Mr. Hinckley's decision 
not to hold you to those payments? 
A. Well, yes, because I could tack that 
money directly on to my remodeling job. 
(Transcript 144-145)(emphasis added). 
Charlene made her assumption based upon Howard's failure 
to press the issue of offset and her interpretation of Dayna's 
alleged conversation with Howard, (Transcript 140, 142-143) not 
based upon any conversation she personally had with Howard. 
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Charlene testified in her affidavit that she and Howard had never 
discussed the issue of Howard's right of offset. 
The record does not reflect any facts which support the 
trial court's finding of waiver and estoppel. The trial court 
erred in denying Howard's prayer for a judgment in the amount of 
one-half of Charlene's net income for the years 1981 to 1989 based 
upon waiver and/or estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Howard Hinckley respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the decision of the District Court and remand this case for 
further proceedings in the matter of his Petition for Modification 
and for findings regarding the change of the relative circumstances 
of Charlene Hinckley and the ability of Charlene Hinckley to 
support herself. 
Appellant further requests this Court to reverse the 
decision of the District Court with regard to judgment in the 
amount of one-half of Charlene Hinckley's net earnings for the 
years 1981-1989. and to remand the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Howard Hinckley in the amount of one-half of 
the net income of Charlene Hinckley, plus interest. 
DATED this / Y ^ day of September, 1990. 
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